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Abstract
Consider a situation where person A undertakes a costly action that bene-
ts person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward
in return from B, then As action may be motivated by the expected rewards
rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental
study is how B reacts to the intentions of A. We vary the probability, with
which the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate, and analyze e¤ects
on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that the perceived kindness
and its rewards are not spoiled by expected rewards.
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1 Introduction
Consider a situation where person A undertakes a costly action that benets person
B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if person A expects a reward in return,
e.g. from person B, then person As action may be motivated by the expected
rewards rather than by pure altruism. If the expected rewards are su¢ ciently high,
even selsh individuals have an incentive to behave in this way. The question we
address in this paper is how person B reacts to the intentions of person A. Does
person B perceive person As action as less kind if he expects person A to expect
rewards, and - if person B can reciprocate - does he return less?
There are many situations where behavior seems altruistic but is obviously strate-
gic. Companies, for example, give Christmas gifts to their business partners in order
to improve the business relationship, hoping that this pays o¤ in future transactions.
Their business partners may well understand that the given Christmas gifts are part
of the companys prot maximizing investment strategy. The question, however, is
whether this knowledge spoils the kindness of the gifts and makes them less e¤ective.
We address this question experimentally in a series of modied trust games. In
these games we vary the probability, with which the second mover can reciprocate,
and investigate e¤ects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that neither
the perceived kindness of the rst movers action nor the second movers rewards
are spoiled by expected future rewards.
In our modied trust game agent A, the rst mover, decides how much of his
initial endowment he transfers to agent B, the second mover. Then, a lottery deter-
mines whether agent B can decide on his return transfer to agent A or not. If not,
nothing is returned to agent A. We conduct two treatments of this modied trust
game that di¤er in the probability, with which agent B can decide on his return
transfer: In treatment T-HIGH this probability is 80 % and in treatment T-LOW
it is 50 %.1 Agent A behaves in a way that seems altruistic when he transfers a
strictly positive amount to agent B. This is true in both treatments. Our treatment
variation, however, changes the possibility for agent B to make a return transfer to
agent A and thereby, reduces the chance for agent A to receive a return. Hence,
agent As expected returns for his transfer are smaller in T-LOW when agent A has
the same belief about agent Bs reaction in both treatments. Consequently, agent
B may perceive agent A as more kind in T-LOW than in T-HIGH and therefore,
1We do not implement probabilities close or equal to 1 and close or equal to 0 since we would
like to avoid the e¤ect that a certain event is going to happen almost for sure.
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may return more in T-LOW than in T-HIGH when he is asked to decide. Agent As
beliefs about agent Bs reaction, however, may di¤er in both treatments. We show
that models of intention-based reciprocity predict that agent B returns (weakly)
more in T-LOW than in T-HIGH. Nevertheless, agent A expects (weakly) smaller
future rewards for a given transfer in T-LOW than in T-HIGH. This is because the
di¤erence in the probability, with which agent B can decide on his return transfer,
dominates the di¤erence in agent Bs equilibrium return transfer.
Our results suggest that expected future returns do not a¤ect the perceived
kindness of an action and its rewards. AgentBs return transfer does not di¤er across
treatments for a given transfer.2 This is not because agent B does not care about
agent As action at all. Actually, we observe a lot of agents B that return strictly
positive amounts, and in addition, agent Bs average return transfer is increasing in
agentAs transfer. This suggests that individuals reward actions that seem altruistic,
independent of the actors expectation of future rewards or of the actors specic kind
of intention. Consequently, we conclude that individuals condition their behavior
on outcomes rather than on intentions or higher order beliefs.
We try to explain our ndings by analyzing data from our questionnaire that
each participant lled out after all decisions in a session had been made. First,
our regressions of agent Bs return transfer on agent Bs (possibly incorrect) second
order belief give no indication that expected future returns spoil the kindness of an
action and its rewards. Second, we analyze whether agent Bs perception of agent
As action is a¤ected by the treatment. We do not nd a signicant e¤ect. Third, we
test treatment di¤erences in agent Bs stated emotions. For some interior values of
agent As transfer negative emotions like anger and contempt are experienced signif-
icantly more intense in T-HIGH than in T-LOW, while appreciation is signicantly
more pronounced in T-LOW than in T-HIGH. Even though intentions may a¤ect
individualsemotions, these e¤ects do not seem to carry over to the perception of
an action and the reaction to it.
Intentions have been modelled in a number of theoretical papers and have been
experimentally examined. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) are examples of models of intention-based reciprocity
2Furthermore, agent Bs average return transfer in our treatments is not higher than the one in
the trust game by Berg et al. (1995), in which the probability, with which that the second mover
can decide on his return transfer, is 100 %. Note, however, that in the trust game by Berg et al.
(1995) the second mover has the same intial endowment as the rst mover. This fact may change
the second movers decision problem.
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that take into account that intentions and higher order beliefs a¤ect the perception
of othersactions and, thereby, behavior. Blount (1995), O¤erman (2002), Falk et
al. (2003), McCabe et al. (2003), Charness (2004), Cox (2004) and Falk et al.
(2008) experimentally test whether the second movers reaction to the rst movers
decision systematically di¤er when the rst movers decision is intentional rather
than non-intentional, i.e. when the rst mover has at least two choices available at
his decision node rather than only one. The results of these studies on intentionality
are mixed and depend on the experimental game that is implemented. In our study,
in contrast, agent As decision is intentional in all treatments3 but the specic kind
of intentions di¤ers across treatments.
Stanca et al. (2009) analyze in their experimental study whether the second
movers reaction di¤ers when the rst movers action is extrinsically motivated rather
than intrinsically.4 They hypothesize, and also nd, that the slope of the second
movers reaction function is larger when the rst mover is intrinsically motivated.
In our experimental study, in contrast, we do not distinguish between extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation since the rst mover may expect a strictly positive return in
both treatments and, therefore, may be extrinsically motivated in both treatments.
We present models of intention-based reciprocity that predict the second mover to
return more for a given transfer in T-LOW than in T-HIGH.5
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and
procedure, Section 3 the behavioral predictions and hypotheses. Our results are
summarized and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design and procedure
We consider a modied trust game with two agents, A and B. Agent A, the trustor,
is initially endowed with wA = 20 and can transfer an amount x 2 f0; 5; 10; 15; 20g
to agent B, the trustee, who is initially endowed with wB = 0. Agent B receives
the tripled amount of agent As transfer, 3  x. After agent As decision on x a
3Moreover, agent As set of actions does not vary across treatments.
4They compare the behavior of second movers in a standard trust game with the behavior of
second movers in a trust game in which rst movers are not informed that second movers can react
on their transfer until they have made their decision. Hence, they implement an asymmetry of
information conditions, which is not present in our experiment. In our experiment all participants
(in all treatments) receive all relevant information at the beginning of the experiment.
5This prediction does not necessarily imply that the slope of the second movers reaction function
is larger in T-LOW than in T-HIGH.
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Figure 1: Structure of the game
lottery determines whether the game stops at this point in time or continues. With
probability 1   q the game stops and agent A earns his initial endowment minus
his transfer, 20   x, while agent B earns agent As tripled transfer, 3  x. With
probability q, though, the game continues and agent B can transfer an amount
y(x) 2 [0; 3  x] to agent A. Then, agent A earns his initial endowment minus his
transfer plus agent Bs return transfer, 20  x+ y(x), and agent B earns agent As
tripled transfer minus his return transfer, 3  x  y(x).6 The structure of this game
is summarized in Figure 1.
The modication of the trust game consists in the random move of nature after
agent As decision on x. If q = 1 the game resembles the standard trust game
introduced by Berg et al. (1995)7. In contrast, if q = 0 the game boils down to a
dictator game8 in which agent B can never return anything to agent A. The higher
q 2 (0; 1), the higher the chance that agent B can make a return transfer (given
x > 0) and the more similar the game is to the standard trust game. The smaller
q 2 (0; 1), the smaller the chance that agent B can make a return transfer (given
x > 0) and the more similar the game is to a dictator game.
As we address the question whether the perceived kindness of an action that
6Note that agent A does not receive the tripled amount of agent Bs return transfer.
7One major di¤erence to the game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) is that in their version of
the trust game agent B has also a strictly positive initial endowment (which equals wA).
8One major di¤erence to standard dictator games is that in the typical versions the dictators
transfer is not tripled.
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seems altruistic and its rewards are reduced by the actors expectation of future
rewards, we vary q, the probability with which agent B can return a positive amount
(given x > 0), across treatments and keep everything else constant. Table 1 presents
our treatments.
Table 1: Treatments
Treatment q Number of
participants
T-HIGH 0.8 40
T-LOW 0.5 60
In treatment T-HIGH q is higher than in treatment T-LOW. We do not imple-
ment probabilities close or equal to 1 and close or equal to 0 since we would like to
avoid the e¤ect that a certain event is going to happen almost for sure. Furthermore,
we are restrained to take higher values of q since agents B are only asked to decide
on y(x) when the game, indeed, continues9. Hence, if q was small, we expected very
few observations of y(x) for a given number of participants.10
In each each experimental session one treatment of the modied trust game
is conducted. The implemented treatment of a session is played once. At the
beginning of each session the roles of the game are assigned randomly. Participants
are informed about their assigned roles after they have correctly answered a set of
control questions. Agents A are always asked to decide on x, while agents B are
only asked to decide on y(x) when the game continues after agent As decision on x.
Given agents B are asked to decide we elicit y(x) by the strategy method, i.e. agents
B are informed that the game continues but are not informed about x and decide
on their return transfer for each possible x.11 After all participants have made their
decisions they ll out a questionnaire concerning their emotions, beliefs, perception
of the other players action and individual data such as gender, age and subject of
9We could have asked all agents B to decide on y(x) given the game continues. Then, however,
treatment e¤ects may have also been caused by social preferences based on expected outcomes and
it would have been di¢ cult to disentangle the source of observed treatment e¤ects.
10For instance, if q = 0:2 and 100 individuals participated in this treatment, 50 individuals were
agents B out of which we expected 10 to be asked to make a decision on y(x).
11We apply the strategy method here in order to get agent Bs reaction function. We are aware
that this elicitation method may a¤ect y(x). However, we expect this e¤ect to be orthogonal to
our treatment variation. Furthermore, Stanca et al. (2009) argue that the strategy method applied
in their trust games does not signicantly a¤ect decisions.
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studies.
Our experimental sessions were run in April 2008 at the Center for Experimental
Economics of the University of Innsbruck, Austria. 100 individuals participated in
the experiment which was conducted with the software z-Tree by Fischbacher (2007).
Individuals were randomly assigned to sessions and could take part only once. The
sessions were framed neutrally12 and lasted about an hour. Subjects earned on
average 10.34 e13 including a show-up fee of 5 e.
3 Behavioral predictions and hypotheses
We address the question whether the perceived kindness of an action that seems
altruistic, i.e. a costly action that benets others, and its rewards are reduced by
the actors expectation to receive future rewards. This may be the case since on
the one hand, future rewards can partially cover the actors initial costs and on the
other hand, they reduce the othersnet benet. In the presented modied trust
game, for instance, agent A behaves in a way that seems altruistic when he transfers
a strictly positive amount to agent B. First, agent As strictly positive amount is
costly because this amount is deducted from his initial endowment. Second, agent
As strictly positive amount benets agent B since the tripled transfer is assigned
to agent B. This is true for both treatments. Agent As expectation to receive a
transfer from agent B in return to his transfer may reduce the perceived kindness
of agent As action, namely to transfer a strictly positive amount. In particular,
the more agent A expects in return for his (given) transfer, the more of agent As
initial costs are covered in expectation, the less expected payo¤ is assigned to agent
B, and therefore, the less kind agent B may perceive agent A and the less agent B
may, in fact, return when he is asked to decide. Our treatment variation changes the
possibility for agent B to make a return transfer to agent A and reduces the chance
for agent A to receive a return. Hence, agent As expected returns for a given transfer
are smaller in T-LOW when agent A has the same belief about agent Bs reaction
in both treatments. Consequently, agent B may perceive agent A as more kind in
T-LOW and therefore, may return more in T-LOW when he is asked to decide. If
this, indeed, is the case and agent As belief about agent Bs reaction is correct and
agent Bs belief about agent As belief is correct, then agent A expects agent B to
transfer more in T-LOW when agent B is asked to decide. Nevertheless, agent A,
12Translated instructions can be found in the appendix.
13The maximum payo¤ paid out was 23 e and the minimum payo¤ 5 e.
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in this case, faces less expected future returns in T-LOW since the di¤erence in q
compensates the di¤erence in agent Bs reaction. If it did not and agent A expected
higher future returns in T-LOW agent B perceived agent A as less kind in T-LOW
and therefore, he transferred less in T-LOW. Consequently, agent As expectation
were incorrect.
In the following we present standard models of social preferences that di¤er in
their assumptions on individuals utility function and, consequently, in their be-
havioral predictions. Some of them explicitly model how the perceived kindness is
reduced by the actors expectation to receive future rewards and predict that agent
B returns more in T-LOW for a given transfer.
3.1 Behavioral predictions
3.1.1 Model 1: The self-interest model
The standard neoclassical model assumes that all individuals are selsh, i.e. their
utility function U depends on their own material payo¤m only and is increasing in
m.
Given these assumptions agent Bs decision does not vary in q 2 (0; 1).
As agent B maximizes his own material payo¤ only, he transfers y(x) = 0 8 x in
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This is true for all q 2 (0; 1).
3.1.2 Model 2: A model of social preferences based on nal outcomes
Models of social preferences based on nal outcomes such as e.g. those by Andreoni
and Miller (2002), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume
that an individuals utility function eU does not only depend onm but also on another
individuals material payo¤ r. This does not necessarily imply that an individual
is altruistic. Individuals with eU may also be spiteful, envious, inequity averse or
inequity loving.
Given these assumptions agent Bs decision does not vary in q 2 (0; 1).
As agent Bs decision is a¤ected by nal outcomes only14 (and not e.g. by how
these outcomes came about), agent B faces the same decision problem at his decision
node independent of q 2 (0; 1). Hence, his optimal decision does not vary across
treatments.
14Models of social preferences based on expected outcomes such as e.g. the one by Trautmann
(2009) predict the same when agent Bs decision is based on his expectations formed at the moment
of his decision making.
8
3.1.3 Model 3: Models of intention-based reciprocity
Models of intention-based reciprocity such as e.g. those by Rabin (1993), Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) assume that an indi-
viduals utility function V is not only dependent on outcomes but also on how
these outcomes came about, e.g. whether the underlying decision problem was de-
termined randomly or whether the underlying decision problem was intentionally
brought about by another individual. A crucial role plays the perceived kindness
of an individuals own action and the perceived kindness of other individualsac-
tions. Typically, the kinder an individual perceives the action of another individual,
the kinder the individual treats this other individual. The perceived kindness of
an action is shaped by the actors intentions. How kindness is dened exactly and
how intentions concretely enter the utility varies across models. In the following
we present the predictions of a modied version of the model by Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) and a similar model that implements central elements from the
model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006).15
A modied version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004)
As the model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is intended for nite multi-
stage games without nature, we take their model and modify it in a simple and
straight-forward way that accounts for random moves of nature. Our modication
consists in the way how agent B perceives the kindness of agent As strategy in
the course of the game, in particular after the lottery determined that the game
continues.16
Given the assumptions of this model y(x) is (weakly)17 higher in T-LOW than
in T-HIGH for x = 20 in any sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE), in which
agent B chooses a pure strategy.
A modied version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) with central elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
We take our modied version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) and implement central elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
15In the appendix we present these models and derive their predictions.
16We discuss the details of this modication in the appendix.
17No treatment di¤erences are predicted if either agent B is hardly sensitive to reciprocity
concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 0 in both treatments, or agent B is extremely sensitive to
reciprocity concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 3  x in both treatments.
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that concern how kindness is dened.18
Given the assumptions of this model y(x) is (weakly)19 higher in T-LOW than
in T-HIGH 8 x > 0 in any sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE), in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy.
3.2 Hypotheses
The various theoretical models predict di¤erent behavioral patterns of agent B. We
focus on the predicted equilibria in which agent B chooses a pure strategy and
summarize these predictions in the following three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: No returns in all treatments
Agent B returns nothing to agent A in T-HIGH and in T-LOW.
This hypothesis is supported by the self-interest model and implies that y(x) = 0
for all x and all treatments. Actions that seem altruistic are never rewarded.
Hypothesis 2: The same returns in all treatments
Agent B returns a weakly positive amount to agent A. Agent Bs return transfer
for a given x is the same in all treatments.
Models of social preferences support this hypothesis. Similar to the self-interest
model there are no treatment e¤ects. In contrast to the self-interest model, agent
B returns a weakly positive amount to agent A. Actions that seem altruistic are
rewarded, independent of the actors intentions.
Hypothesis 3: Higher returns in T-LOW
Agent B returns a weakly positive amount to agent A. y(x) is higher in T-LOW
than in T-HIGH for x > 0.20
Models of intention-based reciprocity take into consideration how a decision prob-
lem came about and therefore, capture the e¤ect of intentions. They predict that
18The details of this model are discussed in the appendix.
19No treatment di¤erences are predicted if either agent B is hardly sensitive to reciprocity
concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 0 in both treatments, or agent B is extremely sensitive to
reciprocity concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 3  x in both treatments.
20This is supported by the modied version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
with central elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006). The modied version of the
model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) predicts y(x) to be higher in T-LOW than in T-
HIGH for x = 20, but not necessarily for all x > 0. The reason for the possibly di¤erent predictions
is that the two models use di¤erent denitions of kindness.
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the perceived kindness of an action that seems altruistic and its rewards are reduced
by the expectation of future returns.
4 Results
We, rst, summarize the descriptive results of our experiment and compare them
with standard results from trust games and dictator games. In a next step, we test
our hypotheses and analyze whether the perceived kindness of an action that seems
altruistic and its rewards are reduced by the expectation of future rewards. Finally,
we try to explain our ndings with data from our questionnaire.
4.1 Summary statistics
4.1.1 Behavior of agent A
Table 2 presents the mean and the standard deviation of agent As transfer in T-
HIGH, T-LOW and both treatments together.
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of x
Treatment Mean Standard Number of
deviation observations
T-HIGH 9.00 5.28 20
T-LOW 7.00 5.81 30
T-HIGH + T-LOW 7.80 5.64 50
On average, agent A transfers 7.8 points (out of 20 available points) to agent B.
This is considerable larger than 0. Camerer (2003), however, reports that in standard
trust games, in which q = 1 and agent B often has the same initial endowment as
agent A, agent A on average transfers half of his initial endowment. This is relatively
more than in our experiment, in particular in T-LOW, what suggests that agents
A transfer less when the probability, with which agent B can reciprocate, is low.
Figure 2 illustrates the aggregate distribution of x in T-HIGH, T-LOW and both
treatments together.
In both treatments together 84 % of agents A transfer strictly positive amounts,
more than 40 % half of their initial endowment or more and more than 10 % even
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Figure 2: Distribution of x
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more than 60 % of their initial endowment (some even their whole initial endow-
ment). This is considerably di¤erent to results from standard dictator games, in
which q = 0 and transfers are not tripled. For instance, in the benchmark treat-
ment by Forsythe et al. (1994)21 about 55 % of dictators transfer a strictly positive
amount, less than 20 % half of their endowment or more and no dictator transfer
more than 60 % of his endowment. This suggests that the distribution of x shifts
towards higher values when q > 0 compared to q = 0.22 When we consider the
distributions of x in T-HIGH and in T-LOW, we observe that that the distribution
is more to the right in T-HIGH than in T-LOW. Hence, it seems that agents A
indeed react to di¤erences in q. They tend to send more, the higher the probability,
with which agent B can reciprocate.
4.1.2 Behavior of agent B
Table 3 presents the mean and the standard deviation of agent Bs return transfer
per x in T-HIGH, T-LOW and both treatments together.
In line with the results from the standard trust game by Berg et al. (1995),
the more agent A transfers, the more agent B returns on average. The observed
average return transfers, however, seem to be lower than the ones by Berg et al.
21Here, we refer to the paid dictator game conducted in April with a pie of 5 $.
22This shift could also be caused by the fact that in standard dictator games agent As transfer
is not tripled. Cox (2004), though, observes that the distribution of transfers in a standard trust
game is centred around higher values than the distribution of transfers in the corresponding trust
game with q = 0.
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Table 3: Mean and standard deviation of y(x)
Treatment x Mean Standard y(x)/x Number of
deviation observations
T-HIGH 5 01.75 02.59 0.35 16
10 06.75 06.14 0.68 16
15 11.06 08.83 0.74 16
20 17.31 13.68 0.87 16
T-LOW 5 01.93 02.76 0.39 15
10 04.93 04.35 0.49 15
15 10.13 08.19 0.68 15
20 16.47 12.00 0.82 15
T-HIGH + T-LOW 5 01.84 02.63 0.37 31
10 05.87 05.34 0.59 31
15 10.61 08.40 0.71 31
20 16.90 12.69 0.85 31
(1995).23 Table 3 also reports the rate of the average return transfer, i.e. the
average return transfer divided by the transfer. Independent of x > 0 the rate of
average return transfer is below 1. Hence, a strictly positive transfer does not pay on
average fo agent A, even if agent A knew beforehand that the game is not stopped.
Nevertheless, the rate of the average return transfer is increasing in x and peaks at
a value more than 0.8 at x = 20.
If we separately examine agent Bs return transfers in the two treatments, we
observe that on average agent B returns more in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for all
x 2 f10; 15; 20g.
4.2 Analysis of hypotheses
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: No returns in all treatments
Table 3 shows that agent Bs average return transfers are considerably higher than
0 for x > 0. P-values of one sample median t-tests on y(x) = 0 per treatment and
per x are reported in Table 4.
On the basis of these tests, we reject hypothesis 1 for all x > 0 and all treatments.
23One explanation for this di¤erence could be that in the experiment by Berg et al. (1995)
agents B have the same initial endowment as agents A.
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Table 4: P-values of one sample median t-tests on hypothesis 1
Percentage of Number of
Treatment x agents B observations p-value
with y(x) = 0
T-HIGH 5 62.50 16 0.015
10 31.25 16 0.001
15 25.00 16 0.001
20 25.00 16 0.001
T-LOW 5 60.00 15 0.015
10 33.33 15 0.002
15 20.00 15 0.001
20 20.00 15 0.001
Nevertheless, Table 4 shows that there are some agents B that return nothing for
some values of x > 0. The percentage of these observations decreases in x. Still, 25
% of agents B in T-HIGH and 20 % of agents B in T-LOW return nothing given
x = 20.
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: The same returns in all treatments
Table 3 indicates that agent Bs average return transfer for a given x > 0 does not
considerably vary across treatments. Table 5 reports per x the two-sided p-values
of Mann-Whitney-U tests on whether y(x) di¤ers across treatments.
Table 5: Two-sided p-values of pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests on hypothesis 2
Number of Number of
x observations observations p-value
in T-HIGH in T-LOW
5 16 15 0.856
10 16 15 0.405
15 16 15 0.873
20 16 15 0.873
On the basis of these tests, we are far from rejecting hypothesis 2. Agent Bs
return transfer does not seem to di¤er across treatments.
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4.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Higher returns in T-LOW
From the results presented in Table 5 we conclude that y(x) is not signicantly
smaller in T-HIGH than in T-LOW neither for x = 20 nor for any other x > 0. If
anything di¤ered between T-HIGH and T-LOW regarding y(x), then y(x) was larger
in T-HIGH than in T-LOW, at least for x 2 f10; 15; 20g. Hence, our data seem to be
inconsistent with hypothesis 3. One may, however, argue that the presented models
of intention-based reciprocity predict no treatment di¤erence either when agent B
is hardly sensitive to reciprocity concerns such that he chooses y(x) = 0 in both
treatments, or when agent B is extremely sensitive to reciprocity concerns such that
he chooses y(x) = 3 x in both treatments. Table 4 reports that in both treatments
a fraction of agents B return nothing even if x = 20. This suggests that a fraction
of agents B are, indeed, hardly sensitive to reciprocity concerns. We, however, do
not observe a single individual with y(x) = 3x in any of our treatments. This rules
out the possibility that a fraction of agents B are extremely sensitive to reciprocity
concerns such that no treatment e¤ects are predicted. Hence, either agents B are, in
general, not sensitive to reciprocity concerns, or too few of agents B are su¢ ciently
sensitive to reciprocity concerns.
We summarize our ndings in the following two results:
Result 1: Rewards for actions that seem altruistic
As in previous studies on trust games (for an overview see Camerer, 2003) we
observe that agent B returns signicantly positive amounts. These amounts on
average increase in agent As transfer.
Result 2: No e¤ect of the intention24
Agent Bs return transfer (for a given x > 0) does not vary across treatments.
These results are consistent with the predictions by models of social preferences,
but inconsistent with the predictions by the self-interest model. The presented mod-
els of intention-based reciprocity may predict no treatment di¤erences, but only for
individuals that are su¢ ciently insensitive to reciprocity concerns or for individuals
that are extremely sensitive to reciprocity concerns. In our data, however, there
is no evidence for individuals that are extremely sensitive to reciprocity concerns.
There may be individuals that are su¢ ciently insensitive to reciprocity concerns
and return nothing. On average, though, agents B return strictly positive amounts.
24Here, we do not question the e¤ect of intentionality, though.
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Consequently, the predictions of the presented models of intention-based reciprocity
are inconsistent with our aggregate results. We conclude that the kindness of an
action and its rewards are not spoiled by the actors expectation to receive future
rewards. On average, actions that seem altruistic are rewarded by others. The re-
wards vary in the action. The more altruistic they seem, the higher are the average
rewards. The average rewards for a given action, though, are independent of the
actors expectation to receive future rewards.
4.3 Possible explanations for our ndings
In this section we try to nd explanations for our ndings by analyzing data from
our questionnaire.
4.3.1 Incorrect higher order beliefs of agent B
The perceived kindness of an action that seems altruistic can only be spoiled by the
actors expectation of future rewards, if individuals expect the actor to expect future
rewards. From other experimental studies we know that individuals have di¢ culties
to draw inferences from other individuals actions and correctly form beliefs.25 In
the following, we analyze whether the given elicited second order beliefs of agent B
directly a¤ect his behavior.26 We regress agent Bs return transfer for a given x on
x and on the product of agent Bs second order belief with q for a given x, i.e. agent
Bs expectation of agent As expected future returns for a given x. First, we estimate
OLS regressions with and without controls such as sex, age and subject of studies.
Second, we run two two-stage least squares instrumental variable regressions, in
which we instrument for the product of agent Bs second order belief with q for a
25Prominent examples are experimental studies on information cascades, e.g. by Anderson and
Holt (1997), Hung and Plott (2001), Kariv (2005), Nöth and Weber (2003) and Goeree et al.
(2007).
26Agent Bs second order belief was elicited in a non-incentivized way after agent B has made his
decision. We are aware that these second order beliefs may be a¤ected by agent Bs own decision.
Therefore, we checked whether agent Bs elicited second order belief signicantly di¤ers from those
elicited by agents B who have not decided upon y(x) because the lottery stopped the game after
agent As decision. We run pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests and do not nd a signicant di¤erence.
Hence, we assume that an agents own action does not inuence his second order beliefs to a large
extent.
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given x27.28 Table 6 presents the results of our four regressions for x > 0.29
Table 6: Regressions of the return transfer for x >0
Dependent variable: y(x) OLS-c1 OLS-c2 2SLS-IV-c1 2SLS-IV-c2
Intercept - 03.05*** - 01.44 - 01.67 +07.38
x +00.79*** +00.71** +00.33 - 00.70
Agent Bs second order belief * q +00.24 +00.33 +00.77 +01.96
Sex - 03.08 - 06.62
(1 if male, 0 else)
Age +00.06 +00.00
Subject of studies - 01.94 - 04.50
(1 if economist, 0 else)
Number of observations 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.3384 0.3697 0.2700 < 0
*, **, *** signicant at 10, 5, 1 percent signicance level
-c with individual clusters
In all of our regressions agent Bs belief about agent As expected return does
not signicantly a¤ect agent Bs return for a given x. In OLS-c1 and OLS-c2 the
only signicant regressor is agent As transfer: The higher agent As transfer, the
more agent B returns. The estimated coe¢ cients of our control variables are all
insignicant.
Result 3: No e¤ect of agent Bs belief about agent As expected returns
Agent Bs elicited beliefs about agent As expected returns do not a¤ect agent
Bs returns.
Consequently, we conclude that incorrect higher order beliefs of agent B are not
the explanation for why the kindness of an action that seems altruistic and its future
rewards are not spoiled by the actors expectation to receive future rewards.
27The instrument we use is q itself as it is exogenous and highly correlated with the instrumented
variable.
28We run these two additional regressions since agent Bs second order belief for x could be
endogenous and, therefore, our estimated OLS coe¢ cients could be biased and inconsistent.
29In all regressions we consider x > 0 since the restriction on x = 20 would considerably reduce
our data set.
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4.3.2 E¤ect only on the perception or on emotions
The perceived kindness of an action may be spoiled by the actors expectation to
receive future rewards without a¤ecting the reactions to that action. In addition, the
actors expectation may a¤ect the reactors emotions in the sense that he experiences
more negative emotions and less positive emotions in T-HIGH than in T-LOW. Table
7 reports one-sided p-values of Mann-Whitney-U tests on whether the perceived
kindness of agent As action30 di¤ers across treatments.
Table 7: One-sided p-values of Mann-Whitney-U tests on perceived kindness across
treatments
Number of Number of Number of Number of
x observations max. int. observations max. int. p-value
in T-HIGH in T-HIGH in T-LOW in T-LOW
0 16 0 15 0 0.1058
5 16 0 15 0 0.0964
10 16 0 15 1 0.0284
15 16 1 15 2 0.2567
20 16 10 15 12 0.2294
max. int. observations perceiving the others kindness with maximal intensity
There are no observations that perceived the others kindness with minimal intensity.
For any x 2 f0; 15; 20g we do not identify any signicant di¤erences in the
perceived kindness across treatments.31 x = 5 and x = 10 are perceived as less kind
in T-HIGH at a signicance level of 10 %. We take this as weak evidence that agent
Bs perception of agent As action is a¤ected by the treatment variation.
Result 4: Hardly no e¤ect of the intention on agent Bs perception of
agent As action
Agent Bs perceived kindness of agent As action does not signicantly vary
across treatments. This is true for x = 20 and for the most other values of x.
Table 8 reports one-sided p-values of Mann-Whitney-U tests on whether the
intensity of hypothetically sensed emotions32 is higher in one of the treatments.
30In our questionnaire agents B had to indicate on a scale ranging from 0 to 7 how kind they
perceive a given transfer by agent A. 0 represented "very unkind", while 7 represented "very kind".
31For x = 20 this could be due to the fact that the majority of agents B choose the maximal
intensity.
32In our questionnaire individuals had to indicate on a scale ranging from 0 to 7 with which
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For x = 20, stated anger is sensed signicantly more strongly in T-HIGH than
in T-LOW at a signicance level of 10 %. There is no signicant di¤erence in the
sensed contempt, gladness and appreciation for x = 20.33
Table 8: One-sided p-values of Mann-Whitney-U tests on emotions across treatments
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Emotion x observations max. int. observations max. int. p-value
in T-HIGH in T-HIGH in T-LOW in T-LOW
Anger 0 16 3 15 1 0.1449
5 16 0 15 0 0.0669
10 16 0 15 0 0.0154
15 16 0 15 0 0.0023
20 16 0 15 0 0.0820
Contempt 0 16 4 15 0 0.0358
5 16 0 15 0 0.0384
10 16 0 15 0 0.0079
15 16 0 15 0 0.0097
20 16 1 15 0 0.4185
Gladness 0 16 0 15 0 0.2011
5 16 1 15 0 0.1242
10 16 1 15 0 0.0989
15 16 1 15 3 0.3273
20 16 12 15 13 0.1791
Appreciation 0 16 0 15 0 0.1439
5 16 0 15 0 0.0054
10 16 0 15 1 0.0060
15 16 0 15 3 0.0579
20 16 9 15 9 0.3954
max. int. observations sensing an emotion with maximal intensity
There are no observations that sensed an emotion with minimal intensity.
For interior values of x, anger is signicantly more strongly pronounced in T-
HIGH than in T-LOW. The same holds for contempt. Only for x = 10 gladness is
signicantly less pronounced in T-HIGH than in T-LOW at a signicance level of
intensity they hypothetically sensed an emotion for each x. If they did not sense an emotion at
all, they were asked to indicate 0 for this emotion and the given x.
33One may, however, argue that regarding the positive emotions a large number of observations
indicated the maximal intensity and therefore, no treatment di¤erences are identied.
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10 %. Appreciation is signicantly less pronounced in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for
interior values of x.
For x = 0 we detect a signicant treatment di¤erence in contempt only.
Result 5: E¤ect of the intention on anger, contempt and appreciation
for interior values of x
Negative emotions such as anger and contempt are signicantly more strongly
pronounced in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for interior values of x. Furthermore, ap-
preciation is signicantly less strongly pronounced in T-HIGH than in T-LOW for
interior values of x. Gladness seems to be una¤ected by the treatment variation for
the most values of x.
Consequently, we conclude that agent Bs emotions may be a¤ected by agent As
intentions. This e¤ect, however, does not seem to carry over to agent Bs perception
of agent As action and to agent Bs reaction.
4.3.3 Other explanations
There are other potential reasons for why the perceived kindness of an action that
seems altruistic and its rewards are not spoiled by the actors expectation of future
rewards in our setting. One reason may be that agent B can voluntarily decide on
his return transfer and is not forced to return a certain amount. Expecting a return
that is voluntarily given may not spoil the kindness of an action. This may be
di¤erent for expecting a return that is not voluntarily given. The presented models
of intention-based reciprocity do not take this into account.
Another reason may be that kindness is not an absolute measure but a relative
one that captures the ranking of actions for a given action set. x = 20, for instance,
may be perceived as the kindest action of agent A and therefore, would be evaluated
as equally kind in both treatments.
5 Conclusion
We have presented an experimental study on whether the perceived kindness of an
action that seems altruistic, i.e. a costly action that benets others, and its rewards
are reduced by the actors expectation to receive future rewards.
In our experimental study second movers in a modied trust game return sig-
nicantly positive rewards to rst movers. These rewards on average increase in
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the rst movers transfer. They, however, do not signicantly vary in the probabil-
ity, with which the second mover can reciprocate. On average, the second movers
return transfer is even slightly higher when the probability that the second mover
can reciprocate is 0.8 rather than 0.5 for some values of x. On the basis of data
from our questionnaire we test whether this is due to incorrect higher order beliefs
of second movers. Our results suggest that this, however, does not seem to be the
case. Furthermore, we test whether the second movers perception or emotions are
inuenced by the probability, with which the second mover can reciprocate. We nd
signicant e¤ects on some of the second movers emotions, at least for some values
of x.
Our results, therefore, suggest that behavior that seems altruistic is rewarded.
The more altruistic it seems, the higher is the reward in return. The reward for
a given action, however, does not vary in the actors expectation to receive future
rewards. This is consistent with the predictions of models of social preferences but
inconsistent with the predictions of the self-interest model and the presented models
of intention-based reciprocity. Hence, individuals in this setting seem to condition
their behavior on outcomes rather than on intentions or higher order beliefs.
Our results seem to be relevant for di¤erent kinds of contexts. Political as well
as commercial campaigns often try to gain the support of a large group of individ-
uals by behaving in a way that seems altruistic, e.g. by distributing small gifts.
Individuals may well anticipate that these gifts are intended to gain their support.
In the light of our results, however, we would conclude that this does not diminish
the e¤ectiveness of the small gifts. Similarly, in some organizations workers are -
nancially incentivized to help their colleagues.34 Workers, therefore, may anticipate
that the help of a colleague is motivated by receiving nancial rewards. We would
conclude that this does not diminish the perceived kindness of help and does not
harm the willingness to reward this action.
This experimental study contributes to the discussion of higher order beliefs and
of intentions. Our results suggest that higher order beliefs and specic kinds of
intentions do not signicantly inuence behavior, at least the reaction to an action
that seems altruistic. It may well be that higher order beliefs and intentions are
crucial for other sorts of behavior, though, e.g. for the reaction to socially unde-
sired behavior. Criminal law often conditions penalties on the criminals intentions.
Hence, the e¤ect of intentions may depend on the specic context.
34A workers wage may, for instance, be dependent on the performance of his colleagues.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Experimental sessions and instructions
6.1.1 Experimental sessions
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Individu-
als were welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they
took their decisions in complete anonymity from the other individuals. The random
allocation to a cubicle also determined an individuals role. The instructions for
the experiment, which each individual found in his cubicle, were read aloud. Then,
individuals could go through the instructions on their own and ask questions. After
all remaining questions were answered and no individual needed more time to go
through the instructions, they had to answer a set of control questions concerning
the procedure of the experiment. After each individual had answered all control
questions correctly, they were informed about their role in the experiment and we
proceeded to the decision stages. First, agents A decided upon x. Second, a com-
puter programm determined randomly which games of a session were stopped. Each
game in a session had the same probability that it is stopped, which corresponded to
q of the implemented treatment of a session. Third, agents B were informed about
whether game was stopped or not. In case the game was not stopped, agents B
decided upon the return transfer for each x. In case the game was stopped, agents
B were asked the question, what they would have transferred in return for each x
if the game continued. During the course of the experiment individuals were asked
questions whose answers were not related to any payments, e.g. agents A were asked
after their decision on x how many points they believe agent B transfers in return
for each x given the game is not stopped, and agents B were asked after their real
or hypothetical decision on y(x), respectively, which intensities of certain emotions
they would experience for each x. After all participants answered the questions
posed to them, all agents were informed about the outcome of the game, i.e. agent
As decision, natures random move on whether the game stops right after agent
As decision, and - in case the game was not stopped - agent Bs decision for the
corresponding x. Finally, we elicited demographic variables such as gender, age and
subject of studies. At the end of the session individuals were paid in cash according
to their earned amount in the modied trust game plus a show-up fee of 5 Euro.
The instructions, the program, and the questionnaire were originally written in
German. The translated instructions for T-HIGH can be found in the following.
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The instructions for T-LOW are similar expect that the probability, with which the
game is stopped right after agent As decision, is q = 0:5.
6.1.2 Translated instructions of T-HIGH
Instructions for the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. You and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants determine
the result of the experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash
according to the actual result of the experiment. So please read the instructions
attentively and think about your decisions carefully. In addition, you receive 
independent of the result of the experiment - a show up fee of 5 Euro.
During the whole experiment it is not allowed to talk with the other participants,
to use mobile phones or to start other programs on the computer. The contempt of
these rules immediately leads to the exclusion of the experiment and of all payments.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An instructor of the experiment
will then come to your seat in order to answer your questions.
During the experiment we talk about points rather than about Euros. Your
whole income is initially calculated in points. At the end of the experiment your
actual amount of total points is converted into Euros according to the following rate:
1 point = 30 Cents.
In this experiment, there are participants A and participants B. Before the
experiment starts, you are informed whether you are a participant A or a participant
B. While entering the room this was randomly determined. If you are participant
A, you are randomly and anonymously matched to a participant B. If you are par-
ticipant B, you are randomly and anonymously matched to a participant A. Neither
during nor after the experiment, you receive any information about the identity of
your matched participant. Likewise, your matched participant does not receive any
information about your identity.
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The procedure
Participant A has an initial endowment of 20 points. Participant B has an initial
endowment of 0 points.
Participant A can decide how much of his initial endowment he transfers to
participant B. Participant A can either choose 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 points.
In order to make this decision, participant A selects one amount on the following
computer screen and presses the OK-button.
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Participant As transfer is then tripled and sent to participant B.
After participant A chose his transfer and participant As tripled
transfer was sent to participant B, it is randomly determined, whether the
experiment is stopped at this point in time.
 With the probability of 20% the experiment is stopped at this point in time.
In this case participant A receives his initial endowment minus his
transfer, and participant B receives participant As tripled transfer.
 With the probability of 80% the experiment is not stopped at this point in
time and participant B decides which integer between 0 and participant As
tripled transfer (including 0 and participant As tripled transfer) he transfers
back to participant A. In this case participant A receives his initial
endowment minus his transfer plus participant Bs back transfer,
and participant B receives participant As tripled transfer minus his
back transfer.
In case the experiment is not stopped right after participant As decision, partic-
ipant B makes the decision about the back transfer. In order to do that participant
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B indicates for each possible transfer of participant A his selected amount on the fol-
lowing computer screen and presses the OK-button. Depending on what participant
A transferred, participant Bs corresponding entry is transferred back to participant
A.
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Participant B makes this decision only if the experiment was not stopped right
after participant As decision.
Example 1: Participant A chooses a transfer of 15 points. Then, it is randomly
determined that the experiment is stopped right after participant As decision. Par-
ticipant A receives 20 15 points = 5 points. Participant B receives 3 * 15 points
= 45 points.
Example 2: Participant A chooses a transfer of 15 points. Then, it is randomly
determined that the experiment is not stopped right after participant As decision.
Participant B chooses a back transfer of 39 points if participant A transferred 15
points. Participant A receives 20  15 + 39 points = 44 points. Participant B
receives 3 * 15 39 points = 6 points.
The procedure is illustrated by the following graph:
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After this procedure participant A and participant B are both informed about
participant As transfer, about whether the experiment was stopped right after par-
ticipant As decision, and - in case the experiment was not stopped right after par-
ticipant As decision - about participant Bs back transfer. Then, the experiment
ends. The procedure is not repeated.
During the course of the experiment you might be asked to answer questions.
The answers to these questions do not a¤ect the payments and the procedure of
the experiment. They are treated anonymously and are not sent to your matched
participant or any other participant.
Before you are informed whether you are participant A or participant B and the
experiment starts, you are asked to answer several control questions concerning the
procedure of the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An instructor of the experiment
will then come to your seat in order to answer your questions.
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6.2 Behavioral predictions of the modied version of the
model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
6.2.1 The basic model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
In Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) individual is utility function in a 2-player
game with individual j is dened in the following way:
Ui = i + Yi  i  i,
where i represents individual is expected own material payo¤, Yi > 0 individual
is parameter of sensitivity to reciprocity concerns, i individual is perception of
the kindness of his own strategy and i individual is perception of the kindness of
individual js strategy. Yi is a parameter that is exogenously given. i, i and i are
dependent on individual is strategy and on individual is belief about individual js
strategy. Furthermore, i also depends on individual is belief about individual js
belief about individual is strategy.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) dene i as individual is expectation of
individual js expected material payo¤35 minus a reference payo¤, which is the mean
of the maximum and the minimum expected material payo¤ individual i beliefs he
could assign to individual j36. i is dened as individual is expectation of individual
js expectation of individual is expected material payo¤37 minus a reference payo¤,
which is the mean of the maximum and the minimum expected material payo¤
individual i beliefs that individual j beliefs he could assign to individual i. In other
words, i is the kindness of individual js strategy from the perspective of individual
i.
35Individual is expectation of individual js expected material payo¤ may not be equal to j
since individual is belief about individual js strategy may not be equal to individual js strategy
and individual is belief about individual js belief about individual is strategy may not be equal
to individual js belief about individual is strategy.
36Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) dene the reference payo¤ as the mean of the maximum
and the minimum expected material payo¤ individual i beliefs he could assign to individual j given
e¢ cient strategies. They dene an e¢ cient strategy as a strategy for which there does not "exist
another strategy which conditional on any history of play and subsequent choices by the others
provides no lower material payo¤ for any player, and a higher material payo¤ for some player for
some history of play and subsequent choices by others" (p.276). In our modied trust game all
strategies are e¢ cient and, therefore, we abstract from this more general denition.
37This may not be equal to individual is expected payo¤ i, since individual is belief about
individual js belief about individual is strategy may not be equal to individual is strategy.
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Note that an individuals beliefs are updated in the course of the game and there-
fore, may di¤er after di¤erent histories of play.38 Hence, an individuals perception
of the kindness of his own strategy and of the other individuals strategy are updated
in the course of the game and may di¤er after di¤erent histories of play. Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) introduce the sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE), in
which each player in each of his decision nodes makes choices that maximize his
utility for the given history, given his updated rst and second order beliefs and
given that he follows his equilibrium strategy at other histories. Furthermore, all
playersinitial rst and second order beliefs are correct and following each history
are updated.
6.2.2 Our modication
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) restrict attention to nite multi-stage games
without nature. However, we could simply consider nature as a third player who
always chooses to stop the game with probability 1   q and to continue the game
with probability q, and to whom agent A and agent B are insensitive to reciprocity
concerns. But this would lead to an unintuitive way of evaluating agent As kindness
in the course of the game: At the beginning of the game agent B has some belief
about agent As strategy and natures strategy. After agent As chosen amount is
transferred and the lottery has chosen to continue the game, agent Bs updated
beliefs are that agent A chooses the given transfer (with probability 1), that nature
chooses to continue the game (with probability 1) and that agent A beliefs that
nature chooses to continue the game (with probability 1). If agent B evaluates the
kindness of agent As strategy given his updated beliefs, he takes into consideration
that agent A beliefs that nature chooses to continue the game with probability 1.
However, agent As belief about natures strategy was di¤erent at agent As decision
node and therefore, agent As intentions were di¤erent.
In order that this is not the case, we undertake a small and natural modication
of the basic model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Our modication consists
in the way how agent B perceives the kindness of agent As strategy in the course
of the game. We let agent B evaluate the kindness of agent As strategy given the
belief that agent A beliefs that nature chooses to continue the game with probability
38For example, individual i may expect individual j to play action a with probability p and
action b with probability 1   p at the beginning of the game (which may, indeed, be correct).
After individual js action a has realized, individual i beliefs that individual j has chosen a with
probability 1, and not p.
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q rather than with probability 1.
6.2.3 Agent Bs utility function when he is asked to decide
Consider agent A has chosen on x and the lottery has determined to continue the
game. Agent B, then, decides on y(x) 2 [0; 3  x] and beliefs that agent A has
chosen x (with probability 1), that nature has chosen to continue the game (with
probability 1) and that agent A beliefs that agent B returns ey(0) = 0, ey(5) 2 [0; 15],ey(10) 2 [0; 30], ey(15) 2 [0; 45], ey(20) 2 [0; 60], where ey(x) represents agent Bs
second order belief for x.
Then, B, agent Bs expected own material payo¤, is equal to 3  x   y(x)
and B, agent Bs perception of the kindness of his own strategy y(x), is equal to
(20  x+ y(x))  

(20 x+0)+(20 x+3x)
2

since the minimum he can assign to agent
A is 20   x + 0 and the maximum 20   x + 3  x. B, agent Bs perception of the
kindness of agent As strategy, is equal to (3  x  q  ey(x))  ref , where ref is the
corresponding reference payo¤ that depends on agent Bs second order beliefs39.
6.2.4 Equilibrium predictions
In this subsection we derive some statements that hold in any SRE, in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy.
Lemma 1a: y(x) is (weakly) increasing in x in any SRE, in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1).
Suppose not. Then, there exists an x0 > x such that y(x0) < y(x) in SRE for
some q 2 (0; 1). As in any SRE actions and beliefs about these actions are the
same, agent B perceives agent A as more kind, when he receives 3  x0 than when
he receives 3  x. This is true since agent A assigns more expected payo¤ to agent
B, when he chooses x0 instead of x:
3  x0   y(x0)  q > 3  x  y(x)  q,
and faces the same reference payo¤ for x0 and x. Hence, B(x0) > B(x). Never-
theless, agent B returns less when he receives 3  x0 than when he receives 3  x. In
order that this is, indeed, optimal for agent B the following two (weak) inequalities
are necessary:
39The maximum agent B beliefs agent A beliefs he can assign to agent B is not necessarily equal
to 3  20  q  ey(20).
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3x0 y(x0)+YBB(x0)
 
y(x0)  3
2
 x0  3x0 y(x)+YBB(x0) y(x)  32  x0,
because agent B could also send back y(x) < 3  x0 given x0 but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x0) in this case, and
3x y(x)+YB B(x)
 
y(x)  3
2
 x  3x y(x0)+YB B(x) y(x0)  32  x,
because agent B could also send back y(x0) < y(x) given x but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x) in this case. The rst (weak) inequality can be rewritten as
1
YB
 B(x0),
and the second as
1
YB
 B(x).
As B(x0) > B(x) this is a contradiction.
Lemma 1b: ey(x) is (weakly) increasing in x in any SRE, in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1).
As in any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy, actions and beliefs
about these actions are the same, y(x) = ey(x) 8 x. Due to Lemma 1a y(x) is
increasing in x in any SRE and therefore, also ey(x).
Lemma 2: (3  x  y(x)  q) is (weakly) increasing in x in any SRE, in
which agent B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1).
Suppose not. Then, there exists an x0 > x such that (3  x0   y(x0)  q) <
(3  x  y(x)  q) in SRE for some q 2 (0; 1). This implies that 3  (x0   x) <
q  (y(x0)  y(x)). As actions and beliefs about these actions are the same in any
SRE agent B perceives agent A as less kind, when he receives 3  x0 than when he
receives 3  x. This is true since agent A assigns less expected payo¤ to agent B,
when he chooses x0 instead of x:
3  x0   y(x0)  q < 3  x  y(x)  q,
and faces the same reference payo¤ for x0 and x. Hence, B(x0) < B(x). As
3  (x0   x) < q  (y(x0)  y(x)) we know that agent B keeps less for himself when
he receives 3  x0 than when he receives 3  x:
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3  x0   y(x0) < 3  x  y(x),
which can be rewritten as
3  (x0   x) < y(x0)  y(x).
This is true because q(y(x0)  y(x)) < y(x0) y(x). In order that this is, indeed,
optimal for agent B the following two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3x0 y(x0)+YBB(x0)
 
y(x0)  3
2
 x0  3x0 y(x)+YBB(x0) y(x)  32  x0,
because agent B could also send back y(x) < 3  x0 given x0 but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x0) in this case, and
3  x  y(x) + YB  B(x) 
 
y(x)  3
2
 x 
3  x  (y(x0)  3  (x0   x)) + YB  B(x) 
 
(y(x0)  3  (x0   x))  3
2
 x,
because agent B could also send back (y(x0)  3  (x0   x))  3  x given x but
(weakly) prefers to send back y(x) in this case. The rst (weak) inequality can be
rewritten as
B(x
0)  1
YB
,
and the second as
B(x)  1YB .
As B(x0) < B(x) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 1: B(x) is (weakly) increasing in x in any SRE, in which
agent B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1).
As in any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy, actions and beliefs
about these actions are the same and Lemma 2 holds, agent B beliefs that agent
A assigns him more expected material payo¤ the higher x. Because agent A faces
the same reference payo¤ for any feasible action of his action set, agent B perceives
agent A the more kind, the higher x. Therefore, B(x0)  B(x) for any feasible
pair of x0 > x.
Proposition 2a: The higher q the (weakly) smaller y(x; q) in any SRE,
in which agent B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1) and x = 20.
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Suppose not. Then, there exists an SRE with y(20; q) for q and an SRE with
y(20; q0) for q0 > q such that y(20; q) < y(20; q0). As in any SRE actions and beliefs
about these actions are the same agent B beliefs that agent A assigns him more
expected payo¤ when the probability that the game is not stopped is q rather than
q0:
3  20  y(20; q)  q > 3  20  y(20; q0)  q0.
Does this necessarily imply that agent B perceives agent A as more kind? This
depends on the reference payo¤ for agent A which may vary in q in SRE. The
reference payo¤ for agent A is, again, the mean of the maximal expected material
payo¤agent A can assign to agent B and the minimal expected material payo¤agent
A can assign to agent B. Due to Lemma 2 we can simply calculate the reference
payo¤s in these SREs by dividing the expected payo¤ agent A assigns to agent B
with x = 20 by 2. Therefore, the reference payo¤ is higher in the SRE with q than
in that with q0. Nevertheless, agent B perceives agent A as more kind in the SRE
with q than in that with q0:
(3  20  y(20; q)  q)  1
2
> (3  20  y(20; q0)  q0)  1
2
.
Hence, B(20; q0) < B(20; q).40 Agent B, still, gives more in the SRE with q0
than in that with q. In order that this is, indeed, optimal for agent B the following
two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  20  y(20; q0) + YB  B(20; q0) 
 
y(20; q0)  3
2
 20 
3  20  y(20; q) + YB  B(20; q0) 
 
y(20; q)  3
2
 20,
because agent B could also send back y(20; q) since he has the same action set
as with q but (weakly) prefers to send back y(20; q0) in this case, and
3  20  y(20; q) + YB  B(20; q) 
 
y(20; q)  3
2
 20 
3  20  y(20; q0) + YB  B(20; q) 
 
y(20; q0)  3
2
 20,
because agent B could also send back y(20; q0) since he has the same action set
as with q0 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(20; q) in this case. The rst (weak)
inequality can be rewritten as
B(20; q
0)  1
YB
,
40This may not be the case for x < 20.
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and the second as
B(20; q)  1YB .
As B(20; q0) < B(20; q) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 2b: y(20; q) in an SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure
strategy, equals y(20; q0) in an SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure
strategy, for q0 > q, q0; q 2 (0; 1), if and only if either y(20; q) = y(20; q0) = 60
or y(20; q) = y(20; q0) = 0.
Suppose not. Then, there exists an SRE with y(20; q) for q and an SRE with
y(20; q0) for q0 > q such that 60 > y(20; q) = y(20; q0) > 0. As in any SRE actions
and beliefs about these actions are the same, agent B beliefs that agent A assigns
him more expected payo¤ when the probability that the game is not stopped is q
rather than q0:
3  20  y(20; q)  q > 3  20  y(20; q0)  q0.
Does this necessarily imply that agent B perceives agent A as more kind? This
depends on the reference payo¤ for agent A which may vary in q in SRE. The
reference payo¤ for agent A is, again, the mean of the maximal expected material
payo¤agent A can assign to agent B and the minimal expected material payo¤agent
A can assign to agent B. Due to Lemma 2, we can simply calculate the reference
payo¤s in these SREs by dividing the expected payo¤ agent A assigns to agent B
with x = 20 by 2. Therefore, the reference payo¤ is higher in the SRE with q than
in that with q0. Nevertheless, agent B perceives agent A as more kind in the SRE
with q than in that with q0:
(3  20  y(20; q)  q)  1
2
> (3  20  y(20; q0)  q0)  1
2
.
Hence, B(20; q0) < B(20; q).41 Agent B, still, gives the same in the SRE with q0
than in that with q. In order that this is, indeed, optimal for agent B the following
two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  20  y(20; q0) + YB  B(20; q0) 
 
y(20; q0)  3
2
 20 
3  20  0 + YB  B(20; q0) 
 
0  3
2
 20,
41This may not be the case for x < 20.
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because agent B could also send back 0 since he has the same action set as with
q but (weakly) prefers to send back y(20; q0) in this case, and
3  20  y(20; q) + YB  B(20; q) 
 
y(20; q)  3
2
 20 
3  20  3  20 + YB  B(20; q) 
 
3  20  3
2
 20,
because agent B could also send back 3  20 since he has the same action set
as with q0 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(20; q) in this case. The rst (weak)
inequality can be rewritten as
B(20; q
0)  1
YB
,
and the second as
B(20; q)  1YB .
As B(20; q0) < B(20; q) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 3: In any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy,
B is (weakly) larger when q = 0:5 than when q = 0:8 for x = 20.
Suppose not. Then, there exists an SRE with y(20; 0:5) for q = 0:5 and an SRE
with y(20; 0:8) such that B (20; 0:5) < B (20; 0:8). Due to Lemma 2 this implies
that y(20; 0:5) > y(20; 0:8). In order that this is, indeed, optimal for agent B the
following two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  20  y(20; 0:5) + YB  B(20; 0:5) 
 
y(20; 0:5)  3
2
 20 
3  20  y(20; 0:8) + YB  B(20; 0:5) 
 
y(20; 0:8)  3
2
 20,
because agent B could also send back y(20; 0:8) since he has the same action set
as with q = 0:5 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(20; 0:5) in this case, and
3  20  y(20; 0:8) + YB  B(20; 0:8) 
 
y(20; 0:8)  3
2
 20 
3  20  y(20; 0:5) + YB  B(20; 0:8) 
 
y(20; 0:5)  3
2
 20,
because agent B could also send back y(20; 0:5) since he has the same action set
as with q = 0:8 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(20; 0:8) in this case. The rst
(weak) inequality can be rewritten as
B(20; 0:5)  1YB ,
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and the second as
B(20; 0:8)  1YB .
As B(20; 0:5) < B(20; 0:8) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 4: In any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy,
agent As expected return, qy(x; q), is (weakly) smaller when q = 0:5 than
when q = 0:8 for x = 20.
From Proposition 3 we know that in any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure
strategy, B =
60 qy(x;q)
2
is (weakly) larger when q = 0:5 than when q = 0:8 for
x = 20. This implies 60 0:5y(x;0:5)
2
> 60 0:8y(x;0:8)
2
for x = 20 which is equivalent to
0:8  y(x; 0:8) > 0:5  y(x; 0:5) for x = 20.
6.2.5 Existence of an SRE
So far, we have developed a couple of statements that hold in any SRE, in which
agent B chooses a pure strategy. In the following we show that at least one such
SRE exists for each of our treatments.
Lemma 3: 8 x and q 2 (0; 1) there exists an optimal pure action for agent
B such that higher order beliefs about agent Bs pure action correspond
to this optimal action, i.e. higher order beliefs are correct.
Take an x < 20, a ey(20) and the fact that agent As reference payo¤ is 60 qey(20)+0
2
in any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy42. Agent Bs utility function
is U(y(x); ey(x)) = 3 x  y(x)+YB  (3 x  q  ey(x)  60 qey(20)+02 )   y(x)  32  x.
U is continuous in y(x) and ey(x), and U(; ey(x)) is quasi-concave. By choosing
y(x) 2 G (ey(x)) = [0; 3  x] agent B can maximize his utility. The correspon-
dence G (ey(x)) is constant and continuous in ey(x). Furthermore, for any ey(x)
G (ey(x)) is non-empty, compact and convex-valued. Consequently, we can apply
Berges Maximum Theorem and conclude that for any ey(x) 2 [0; 3  x] there exists
a y(x) 2 [0; 3  x] that maximizes U(y(x); ey(x)) and the correspondence Y (ey(x)) :
[0; 3  x] ! [0; 3  x] that maps ey(x) 2 [0; 3  x] into the set of y(x) 2 [0; 3  x] that
maximize U(y(x); ey(x)) is non-empty, compact-valued, upper-hemicontinuous and
convex-valued. It remains to show that Y (ey(x)) has a xed point ey(x) 2 Y (ey(x)),
42This is due to Lemma 2.
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i.e. higher order beliefs are correct. We apply Kakutanis Fixed Point Theorem and
conclude that at least one xed point exists.
For x = 20 and the fact that agent As reference payo¤ is 60 qey(20)+0
2
in any
SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy43, agent Bs utility function is
U(y(20); ey(20)) = 3  20   y(20) + YB  B  12  (60   q  ey(20))  f (y(20)  30).
Again, U is continuous in y(20) and ey(20), U(; ey(20)) is quasi-concave, and [0; 60]
is continuous in ey(20), non-empty, compact and convex-valued. As above we can
conclude that for any ey(20) 2 [0; 60] there exists a y(20) 2 [0; 60] that maximizes
U(y(20); ey(20)) and that there exist at least one higher order belief ey(20) that is
correct.
Proposition 5: For any q 2 (0; 1) there exists an SRE, in which agent B
chooses a pure strategy.
Due to Lemma 3 it remains to show that given agent Bs pure optimal strat-
egy agent A has an optimal (possibly randomized) strategy that is correctly ex-
pected. Take any pure strategy of agent B. Let agent As utility function be
U (a;ea) = A + YA  A  A, with a 2 X as agent As (possibly randomized)
action, ea 2 X as agent As second order belief on a, and X as agent As set of
possibly randomized actions. U (a;ea) is continuous, U(;ea) is quasi-concave, and X
is continuous in ea, non-empty, compact and convex-valued. Hence, we can apply
Berges Maximum Theorem and conclude that for any ea there exists a set of ac-
tions X (ea) out of which each action is part of the set X and maximizes agent As
utility given ea. Furthermore, X (ea) : X ! X is a non-empty, compact, convex-
valued upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. Consequently, we can apply Kaku-
tanis Fixed Point Theorem and conclude that X (ea) has at least one xed point.
6.3 Behavioral predictions of the modied version of the
model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) with cen-
tral elements of the model by Falk and Fischbacher
(2006)
6.3.1 The model
We consider the same utility function of individual i as from the modied version of
the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), but dene i and i di¤erently.
43This is due to Lemma 2.
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The interpretation of these terms, though, remains the same. The reference payo¤s
in these two terms change: We dene the reference payo¤ for i as individual is
expected material payo¤, i, and the reference payo¤ for i as the individual is
expectation of individual js expected payo¤. The updating of beliefs and the SRE
are the same as in the modied version of the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004).
6.3.2 Agent Bs utility function when he is asked to decide
Consider agent A has chosen on x and the lottery has determined to continue the
game. Agent B, then, decides on y(x) 2 [0; 3  x] and beliefs that agent A has
chosen x > 0 (with probability 1), that nature has chosen to continue the game (with
probability 1) and that agent A beliefs that agent B returns ey(0) = 0, ey(5) 2 [0; 15],ey(10) 2 [0; 30], ey(15) 2 [0; 45], ey(20) 2 [0; 60], where ey(x) represents agent Bs
second order belief for x.
Then, B, agent Bs expected own material payo¤, is equal to 3x y(x) and B,
agent Bs perception of the kindness of his own strategy, is equal to (20  x+ y(x)) 
(3  x  y(x)). B, agent Bs perception of the kindness of agent As strategy, is
equal to (3  x  q  ey(x))  (20  x+ q  ey(x)).
6.3.3 Equilibrium predictions
In this subsection we derive some statements that hold in any SRE, in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy.
Lemma 1a: y(x) is (weakly) increasing in x in every SRE, in which
agent B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1).
Suppose not. Then, there exists an x0 > x such that y(x0) < y(x) in SRE:.
Because in any SRE actions and beliefs about these actions are the same, agent B
perceives agent A as more kind, when he receives 3  x0 than when he receives 3  x.
This is true since agent A assigns more expected payo¤ to agent B, when he chooses
x0 instead of x:
3  x0   y(x0)  q > 3  x  y(x)  q,
and faces a smaller reference payo¤ for x0 than for x:
20  x0 + y(x0)  q < 20  x+ y(x)  q.
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Hence, B(x0) > B(x). Nevertheless, agent B returns less when he receives 3x0
than when he receives 3  x. In order that this is, indeed, optimal for agent B the
following two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  x0   y(x0) + YB  B(x0)  (20  4  x0 + 2  y(x0)) 
3  x0   y(x) + YB  B(x0)  (20  4  x0 + 2  y(x)),
because agent B could also send back y(x) < 3  x0 given x0 but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x0) in this case, and
3  x  y(x) + YB  B(x)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x)) 
3  x  y(x0) + YB  B(x)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x0)),
because agent B could also send back y(x0) < y(x) given x but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x) in this case. The rst (weak) inequality can be rewritten as
1
2YB  B(x0),
and the second as
1
2YB  B(x).
As B(x0) > B(x) this is a contradiction.
Lemma 1b: ey(x) is (weakly) increasing in x in any SRE, in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1).
As in any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy, actions and beliefs
about these actions are the same, y(x) = ey(x) 8 x. Due to Lemma 1a y(x) is
increasing in x in any SRE and therefore, also ey(x).
Lemma 2: (3  x  y(x)  q) is (weakly) increasing in x in every SRE, in
which agent B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1).
Suppose not. Then, there exists an x0 > x such that (3  x0   y(x0)  q) <
(3  x  y(x)  q) in SRE. This implies that 3  (x0   x) < q  (y(x0)  y(x)). As
actions and beliefs about these actions are the same in any SRE agent B perceives
agent A as less kind when he receives 3 x0 than when he receives 3 x. This is true
since agent A assigns less expected payo¤ to agent B when he chooses x0 instead of
x:
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3  x0   y(x0)  q < 3  x  y(x)  q,
and faces a larger reference payo¤ for x0 than for x:
20  x0 + y(x0)  q > 20  x+ y(x)  q,
which can be rewritten as
q  (y(x0)  y(x)) > x0   x.
The above inequality holds since q(y(x0)  y(x)) > 3(x0   x). Hence, B(x0) <
B(x). As 3  (x0   x) < q  (y(x0)  y(x)) we also know that agent B keeps less
when he receives 3  x0 and more when he receives 3  x:
3  x0   y(x0) < 3  x  y(x),
which can be rewritten as
3  (x0   x) < y(x0)  y(x).
This is true because q(y(x0)  y(x)) < y(x0) y(x). In order that this is, indeed,
optimal for agent B the following two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  x0   y(x0) + YB  B(x0)  (20  4  x0 + 2  y(x0)) 
3  x0   y(x) + YB  B(x0)  (20  4  x0 + 2  y(x)),
because agent B could also send back y(x) < 3  x0 given x0 but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x0) in this case, and
3  x  y(x) + YB  B(x)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x)) 
3  x  (y(x0)  3  (x0   x)) + YB  B(x)  (20  4  x+ 2  (y(x0)  3  (x0   x))),
because agent B could also send back (y(x0)  3  (x0   x))  3  x given x but
(weakly) prefers to send back y(x) in this case. The rst (weak) inequality can be
rewritten as
B(x
0)  1
2YB ,
and the second as
B(x)  12YB .
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As B(x0) < B(x) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 1: B(x) is (weakly) increasing in x in every SRE, in which
agent B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 f0:5; 0:8g.
Suppose not. Then, there exists an x0 > x such that B(x0) < B(x) in SRE.
Due to Lemma 1a, y(x0) > y(x) in any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure
strategy. Furthermore, we know that when q 2 f0:5; 0:8g y(x) < 3  x in SRE.44
Hence, agent B has the opportunity to return more than y(x) given x. In order that
the behavior as described above is, indeed, optimal for agent B the following two
(weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  x0   y(x0) + YB  B(x0)  (20  4  x0 + 2  y(x0)) 
3  x0   y(x) + YB  B(x0)  (20  4  x0 + 2  y(x)),
because agent B could also send back y(x) < 3  x0 given x0 but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x0) in this case, and
3  x  y(x) + YB  B(x)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x)) 
3  x  3  x+ YB  B(x)  (20  4  x+ 2  3  x),
because agent B could also send back 3  x > y(x) given x but (weakly) prefers
to send back y(x) in this case. The rst (weak) inequality can be rewritten as
B(x
0)  1
2YB
and the second as
B(x)  12YB
As B(x0) < B(x) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 2a: The higher q the (weakly) smaller y(x; q) in any SRE,
in which agent B chooses a pure strategy, 8 q 2 (0; 1) and x > 0.
Suppose not. Then, there exists an SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure
strategy, with y(x; q) for q and x > 0 and an SRE, in which agent B chooses a
pure strategy, with y(x; q0) for q0 > q and x > 0 such that y(x; q) < y(x; q0). As in
any SRE actions and beliefs about these actions are the same, agent B beliefs that
agent A assigns him more expected payo¤ when the probability that the game is
not stopped is q rather than q0:
44If not and y(x) = ey(x) = 3  x, B(x) = 4  x   20   2  ey(x)  q, which is smaller than 0 for
q 2 f0:5; 0:8g, and agent B preferred to return nothing.
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3  x  y(x; q)  q > 3  x  y(x; q0)  q0.
Furthermore, the reference payo¤ for agent A is smaller when the probability
that the game is not stopped is q rather than q0:
20  x+ y(x; q)  q < 20  x+ y(x; q0)  q0.
Hence, B(x; q0) < B(x; q). Again, this is true 8x > 0. Agent B, still, gives
more in the SRE with q0 than in that with q. In order that this is, indeed, optimal
for agent B the following two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  x  y(x; q0) + YB  B(x; q0)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; q0)) 
3  x  y(x; q) + YB  B(x; q0)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; q)),
because agent B could also send back y(x; q) since he has the same action set as
with q but (weakly) prefers to send back y(x; q0) in this case, and
3  x  y(x; q) + YB  B(x; q)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; q)) 
3  x  y(x; q0) + YB  B(x; q)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; q0)),
because agent B could also send back y(20; q0) since he has the same action set
as with q0 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(20; q) in this case. The rst (weak)
inequality can be rewritten as
B(x; q
0)  1
2YB ,
and the second as
B(x; q)  12YB .
As B(x; q0) < B(x; q) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 2b: For x > 0 y(x; q) in an SRE, in which agent B chooses
a pure strategy, equals y(x; q0) in an SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure
strategy, for q0 > q, q0; q 2 (0; 1), if and only if either y(x; q) = y(x; q0) = 3  x
or y(x; q) = y(x; q0) = 0.
Suppose not. Then, there exists an SRE with y(x; q) for q and an SRE with
y(x; q0) for q0 > q such that 3  x > y(x; q) = y(x; q0) > 0. As in any SRE actions
and beliefs about these actions are the same, agent B beliefs that agent A assigns
him more expected payo¤ when the probability that the game is not stopped is q
rather than q0:
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3  x  y(x; q)  q > 3  x  y(x; q0)  q0.
Furthermore, the reference payo¤ for agent A is smaller when the probability
that the game is not stopped is q rather than q0:
20  x+ y(x; q)  q < 20  x+ y(x; q0)  q0.
Hence, B(x; q0) < B(x; q). Again, this is true 8 x > 0. Agent B, still, gives the
same in the SRE with q0 than in that with q. In order that this is, indeed, optimal
for agent B the following two equalities are necessary:
3  x  y(x; q0) + YB  B(x; q0)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; q0)) 
3  x  0 + YB  B(x; q0)  (20  4  x+ 2  0),
because agent B could also send back 0 since he has the same action set as with
q but (weakly) prefers to send back y(x; q0) in this case, and
3  x  y(x; q) + YB  B(x; q)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; q)) 
3  x  3  x+ YB  B(x; q)  (20  4  x+ 2  3  x),
because agent B could also send back 3  x since he has the same action set
as with q0 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(x; q) in this case. The rst (weak)
inequality can be rewritten as
B(x; q
0)  1
2YB ,
and the second as
B(x; q)  12YB .
As B(x; q0) < B(x; q) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 3: In any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy,
B is (weakly) larger when q = 0:5 than when q = 0:8 for x > 0.
Suppose not. Then, there exists an SRE with y(x; 0:5) for q = 0:5 and an SRE
with y(x; 0:8) for an x > 0 such that A (x; 0:5) < A (x; 0:8). This implies that
y(x; 0:5) > y(x; 0:8). In order that this is, indeed, optimal for agent B the following
two (weak) inequalities are necessary:
3  x  y(x; 0:5) + YB  B(x; 0:5)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; 0:5)) 
3  x  y(x; 0:8) + YB  B(x; 0:5)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; 0:8)),
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because agent B could also send back y(x; 0:8) since he has the same action set
as with q = 0:8 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(x; 0:5) in this case, and
3  x  y(x; 0:8) + YB  B(x; 0:8)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; 0:8)) 
3  x  y(x; 0:5) + YB  B(x; 0:8)  (20  4  x+ 2  y(x; 0:5)),
because agent B could also send back y(x; 0:5) since he has the same action set
as with q = 0:5 but (weakly) prefers to send back y(x; 0:8) in this case. The rst
(weak) inequality can be rewritten as
B(x; 0:5)  12YB ,
and the second as
B(x; 0:8)  12YB .
As B(x; 0:5) < B(x; 0:8) this is a contradiction.
Proposition 4: In any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure strategy,
agent As expected return, qy(x; q), is (weakly) smaller when q = 0:5 than
when q = 0:8 for x > 0.
From Proposition 3we know that in any SRE, in which agent B chooses a pure
strategy, B = 4  x  2  q  y(x; q)  20 is (weakly) larger when q = 0:5 than when
q = 0:8 for x > 0. This implies 4x 20:5y(x; 0:5) 20 > 4x 20:8y(x; 0:8) 20
for x > 0 which is equivalent to 0:8  y(x; 0:8) > 0:5  y(x; 0:5) for x > 0.
6.3.4 Existence of an SRE
So far, we have developed a couple of statements that hold in any SRE, in which
agent B chooses a pure strategy. In the following we show that at least one such
SRE exists for each of our treatments.
Lemma 3: 8 x and q 2 (0; 1) there exists an optimal pure action for
agent B such that higher order beliefs about agent Bs pure action cor-
respond to this optimal action, i.e. higher order beliefs are correct.
Take an x and the fact that agent As reference payo¤ is 20 x+ q  ey(x). Agent
Bs utility function is U(y(x); ey(x)) = 3  x   y(x) + YB  (3  x   q  ey(x)   20 +
x   q  ey(x))  (20  4  x+ 2  q  y(x)). U is continuous in y(x) and ey(x), and
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U(; ey(x)) is quasi-concave. By choosing y(x) 2 G (ey(x)) = [0; 3  x] agent B can
maximize his utility. The correspondence G (ey(x)) is constant and continuous iney(x). Furthermore, for any ey(x) G (ey(x)) is non-empty, compact and convex-valued.
Consequently, we can apply Berges Maximum Theorem and conclude that for anyey(x) 2 [0; 3  x] there exists a set of y(x) 2 [0; 3  x] that maximize U(y(x); ey(x)) and
the correspondence Y (ey(x)) : [0; 3  x] ! [0; 3  x] that maps ey(x) 2 [0; 3  x] into
the y(x) 2 [0; 3  x] that maximizes U(y(x); ey(x)) is non-empty, compact-valued,
upper-hemicontinuous and convex-valued. It remains to show that Y (ey(x)) has
a xed point ey(x) 2 Y (ey(x)), i.e. higher order beliefs are correct. We apply
Kakutanis Fixed Point Theorem and conclude that at least one xed point exists.
Proposition 5: For any q 2 (0; 1) there exists an SRE, in which agent
B chooses a pure strategy.
Due to Lemma 3it remains to show that given agent Bs pure optimal strat-
egy agent A has an optimal (possibly randomized) strategy that is correctly ex-
pected. Take any pure strategy of agent B. Let agent As utility function be
U (a;ea) = A + YA  A  A, with a 2 X as agent As (possibly randomized)
action, ea 2 X as agent As higher order belief on a, and X as agent As set of
possibly randomized actions. U (a;ea) is continuous, U(;ea) is quasi-concave, and X
is continuous in ea, non-empty, compact and convex-valued. Hence, we can apply
Berges Maximum Theorem and conclude that for any ea there exists a set of ac-
tions X (ea) out of which each action is part of the set X and maximizes agent As
utility given ea. Furthermore, X (ea) : X ! X is a non-empty, compact, convex-
valued upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. Consequently, we can apply Kaku-
tanis Fixed Point Theorem and conclude that X (ea) has at least one xed point.
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